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2ND ESTAL PHD AWARD NOMINATIONS ∙ Soft Law and Their Symbiotic Relationship with the Block Exemptions? Journal Artikel

A Nordic Perspective

Katrine Lillerud

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 20 (2021), Ausgabe 3, Seite 337 - 358

This article provides an overview of the position of quasi-legislative measures also referred to as ‘soft law’ before and after the State aid Modernisation (SAM). The main intention of the article is to illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the revised horizontal and sectorial guidelines with the general block exemption regulation (GBER) after SAM. It demonstrates how a selected handful of horizontal and sectorial guidelines have been transformed to facilitate better use of the block exemption to enhance the Commission’s own policy objectives, in a nice hand in glove fit with the GBER to nudge States into block exempted expenditure. The empirical study compares Norway, Sweden and Finland’s use of the GBER and guidelines. It shows that the framework is now more than ever nudging aid expenditure. The micro study reveals a drastic change in use before and after SAM in the three Nordic countries – underling the nudging power of the reform. Keywords: EStAL PhD Award; soft law; guidelines; GBER; horizontal; SAM; nudging; Nordics.


Does a ‘Copy-Paste’ of the Antitrust Toolbox for Information Collection Work When Regulating States, and Not Undertakings? Journal Artikel

Katrine Lillerud

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 19 (2020), Ausgabe 3, Seite 314 - 328

The State aid reform appears to assimilate the rules already existing for cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers, by incorporating several of the competition law tools on information collection. The question asked is whether these tools initially designed to regulate undertakings are effective when regulating a State’s behaviour. The article draws a parallel to similar tools in competition law under Regulation 1/2003 and contextualise why change was introduced in the 2014 State aid reform. It investigates the use and success of the new tools by a case study of these new powers. The empirical data indicate that optimal use of direct access to information from third parties is hindered by a lack of transparency and too high thresholds for the Commission to use the new tools. Keywords: information collection, sector inquiry, fines, third parties, Regulation 1/2003, SAM


The National Transparency Registers in Action Journal Artikel

Katrine Lillerud

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 18 (2019), Ausgabe 3, Seite 239 - 248

National registers on individual aid grants above €500 000 became mandatory from 1 July 2016. The European Commission hopes the registers will promote compliance, raise awareness on aid granted and function as a disciplinary measure. They count on the registers to ensure better control at the national level, by incentivising beneficiaries to comply and by providing enough information for competitors to check whether aid was lawfully granted. This article provides a case study of how the national registers function in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The three European Economic Area States are an interesting case study as they are the only countries that have opted for their own national transparency registers, whilst the EU Member States all use the Commission’s portal. The findings show that the transparency registers currently do not provide the information required for competitors to assess the compatibility of an aid measure with the internal market. Almost all the published aid measures lack a link to the national legal basis or the granting authorities’ decision on the individual aid measure. These shortcomings are easily corrected. However, if left unattended, they arguably render block exempted aid unlawful. Currently, the effect of the national registers appears to be that they induce competitors to apply for aid rather than litigate on it. Keywords: Ex post evaluation; Block exemptions; National transparency registers; Individual aid; Privatization of State aid enforcement; Transparency communication

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