Valérie Noël, Sébastien Thomas

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 4, Page 512 - 528

In the Montessori ruling, the Court of justice confirmed the right of competitors of an aid scheme to bring an appeal against a Commission decision relating to this scheme. The ruling provides a flexible interpretation of the three conditions laid down in the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU. We analyze the judgment of the Court and show that it creates differences in the ability of competitors of beneficiaries of State aid to access EU courts. Access is easier if the aid flows from a state aid regime rather than if the aid is granted individually. The Montessori ruling could have important implications for the notion of 'direct concern' in other areas of EU law such as anti-dumping. To date, the Court seems to restrict the use of the Montessori ruling to rules on State aid. This approach could create confusion and lead to more stringent conditions regarding the notion of direct concern in other areas of EU law. Keywords: admissibility; locus standi; regulatory act; direct concern; regulatory act not entailing implementing measures; right not to be subject to competition distorted Milestones Preview: this article is based on a chapter of the upcoming second edition of the book 'Milestones in State Aid Case Law' (Lexxion 2022).

Sébastien Thomas

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 10 (2011), Issue 3, Page 501 - 511

I. Introduction The European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Case C-362/09 P Athinaïki Techniki (hereinafter “Athinaïki II”) on 16 December 2010. This is the second judgment on appeal that the Court has delivered in this saga, overruling (again) an Order of inadmissibility of the General Court. The Court had indeed already declared by its judgment of 17 July 2008 in Case C-521/06 P Athinaïki Techniki (hereinafter “Athinaïki I”) that th