Adrien Giraud, Sylvain Petit

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 2, Page 233 - 242

In its decisional practice developing tax ruling, the European Commission uses a theoretical reasoning that can in some instances appear somewhat disconnected from the facts of the cases. Indeed, all these cases boil down to one single determination (whether the concerned transfer prices were – or not – set at market levels) and the satisfaction of all the conditions for the existence of State aid derive directly from this (rather theoretical) question alone. Little to no account taken of important factual elements (such as for example the context of international fiscal competition) and several conclusions appear to be presumed rather than demonstrated (for example the distortion of competition). One therefore remains with the general impression that State aid law remains into a sort of exception to the rest of competition law: an area of law where reality does not (really) matter. Keywords: Tax Ruling; Selectivity; Advantage; Distortion of Competition; Counterfactual.

Michael Honoré

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 2, Page 181 - 192

Public authorities are increasingly engaging in economic activities. This may give problems of competitive neutrality, as also highlighted by the OECD. The purpose of this article is to illustrate some of the complex – and often overlooked - State aid issues that may arise when an economic activity is carried out by a public authority, with particular emphasis on the issue of aid (cross-subsidisation) at the level of the public undertaking. It is contended that State aid law is a potent instrument for private operators faced with competing public undertakings, and that State aid law may in fact impose requirements upon public authorities in terms of accounting separation and benchmarking, which go further than the requirements under e.g. the State Aid Transparency Directive and antitrust-law (including Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU). Keywords: Notion of Advantage; Cross-Subsidisation; Public Undertakings; Separation of Accounts; Implied and Unlimited Guarantees.

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 2, Page 146 - 153

A question that is often asked is whether companies derive an advantage in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if they receive compensation for the extra costs they incur when they have to provide services as a result of obligations imposed on them by the State. The answer given in the case law is that no advantage is obtained when such compensation satisfies the so-called “Altmark” conditions. Recently, however, the General Court and the Court of Justice have provided contradictory answers in relation to compensation for the extra costs of pension obligations towards former civil servants. While the Court of Justice followed the consistent approach of the case law, the General Court considered that the extra costs incurred by Deutsche Post, the undertaking in question, were not normal because such costs were not borne by other postal operators. This article argues that the reasoning of the General Court is defective or at least incomplete because it failed to take into account the total employment costs of Deutsche Post from employing former civil servants and whether it could have enjoyed other advantages from their employment. Keywords: Advantage; Normal Costs; Distortion of Competition; Compensation.