Nicole Robins, Hannes Geldof

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 4, Page 494 - 508

The EU’s State aid modernisation reforms introduced a role for ex post evaluations of aid schemes. State aid evaluation provides an opportunity to continuously improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid schemes to ensure that their positive impact outweighs possible distortions to competition and trade. Traditionally, the role for an extensive analysis of the impact of aid on competition has been limited compared with other areas of competition policy, such as merger control, and assessments of anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance. The European Commission therefore asked Oxera to develop an economic framework that can be used to assess the competitive effects of aid, and to gain further insights into the actual impact of aid on competition. Oxera’s study may have significant implications for future State aid control. This article discusses the economic framework developed by Oxera as well as insights from Oxera’s study into the main drivers of the likely impact of aid on competition.

Lorenzo Panci

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 3, Page 353 - 367

The notion of material selectivity is key to defining the reach of State aid control. I will argue that the ECJ progressively endorsed an increasingly extensive interpretation of the selectivity requirement (which culminated in the Gibraltar judgment), making it easier for the European Commission to demonstrate its fulfilment. One of the consequences of this evolution was that State aid control became easier to use to pursue policy objectives. This was especially true in the context of taxation, despite the lack of harmonisation in this field. However, at the outset of the Gibraltar judgment, the General Court appeared to have taken a position that preserves the policy choices made at national level and this was possible by interpreting the selectivity condition as more difficult to fulfil. On the other hand, it appears that the Commission reacted to the Gibraltar judgment by using State aid control to pursue its policy objectives, in particular to contrast harmful tax competition among MS. Will the European Court of Justice endorse the approach taken by the Commission? Keywords: Selectivity; Gibraltar; Tax Rulings; Tax Competition.

Eugene Stuart

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 2, Page 209 - 232

Every State aid regulatory decision in the EU has political, economic and administrative dimensions in addition to the application of legal rules and principles. The Apple Decision of August 2016, imposing a record recovery order against Ireland, is no exception. In the context of the use of the EU State aid rules to promote fair tax competition, and contribute indirectly to failed tax harmonisation, this article looks in detail at the Apple Decision together with its implications in the context of EU State aid and taxation policy and some of the sensitive political repercussions arising from the Decision. State aid in the EU via tax measures continues to represent about one-third of all State aid. Accordingly, it is also topical and useful to explore the logic and motivation of the European Commission in treating tax measures as liable to give rise to State aid concerns (and as priority and major cases) in the context of the Apple Decision and the soft law measures, Commission decisions and case law which preceded it. The case is currently on appeal and, although the Irish arguments do not seem strong at first sight, on several points the position of the Apple entities and of the Irish tax authorities will need to be analysed in detail by the Court in response to the Irish arguments and there is likely to be some scope for certain Commission positions in the case to be over-turned on points of fact, if further proven in the appeal. In reviewing the Apple Decision, the EU Courts will soon have an important (or even historic) opportunity to decide whether or not to further support the legality of the Commission’s continuing expansion of its State aid remit in regard to allegedly unfair tax measures. Keywords: Tax Rulings; Unfair Tax Competition; Tax Harmonisation; Arm’s Length Principle; Record State Aid Recovery.

Nicole Coutrelis, Thomas Gourdeau

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 4, Page 639 - 641

Adrien Giraud, Sylvain Petit

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 2, Page 233 - 242

In its decisional practice developing tax ruling, the European Commission uses a theoretical reasoning that can in some instances appear somewhat disconnected from the facts of the cases. Indeed, all these cases boil down to one single determination (whether the concerned transfer prices were – or not – set at market levels) and the satisfaction of all the conditions for the existence of State aid derive directly from this (rather theoretical) question alone. Little to no account taken of important factual elements (such as for example the context of international fiscal competition) and several conclusions appear to be presumed rather than demonstrated (for example the distortion of competition). One therefore remains with the general impression that State aid law remains into a sort of exception to the rest of competition law: an area of law where reality does not (really) matter. Keywords: Tax Ruling; Selectivity; Advantage; Distortion of Competition; Counterfactual.

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 2, Page 146 - 153

A question that is often asked is whether companies derive an advantage in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if they receive compensation for the extra costs they incur when they have to provide services as a result of obligations imposed on them by the State. The answer given in the case law is that no advantage is obtained when such compensation satisfies the so-called “Altmark” conditions. Recently, however, the General Court and the Court of Justice have provided contradictory answers in relation to compensation for the extra costs of pension obligations towards former civil servants. While the Court of Justice followed the consistent approach of the case law, the General Court considered that the extra costs incurred by Deutsche Post, the undertaking in question, were not normal because such costs were not borne by other postal operators. This article argues that the reasoning of the General Court is defective or at least incomplete because it failed to take into account the total employment costs of Deutsche Post from employing former civil servants and whether it could have enjoyed other advantages from their employment. Keywords: Advantage; Normal Costs; Distortion of Competition; Compensation.