Federica Maldari

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 18 (2019), Issue 3, Page 398 - 403

The Case deals with the decision of Portuguese authorities to put Banco Espirito Santo SA (BES) into resolution and to immediately create a ‘Bridge Bank’. The Portuguese authorities notified to the EC the proposal to grant €4.899 million of State aid to the ‘Bridge Bank’ by way of initial share capital. The EC concluded that the State aid at issue was compatible with the internal market. BPC Lux 2 Sàrl and the other subordinated creditors of BES initiated proceedings before national courts and ultimately to the Court of the Justice of the European Union. On 7 November 2018, the Court of Justice rejected the General Court’s Order to dismiss the action as inadmissible due to lack of interest. Consequently, the Court of Justice confirmed the principle that an interest in bringing annulment proceedings may arise where the annulment might benefit the applicant in pending proceedings before national courts. Keywords: State aid; Financial crisis; Subordinated creditors; Damages; Annulment proceedings; National legal basis.

Małgorzata Agnieszka Cyndecka

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 4, Page 546 - 552

In the awaited FIH judgment, the CJEU once again reviewed the question of costs or risks that may be taken into account under the application of the MEOP. It is now clear that the origins of such costs or risks are crucial. What may make sense in terms of economics, which is one of the two components of the MEOP, is not necessarily in line with State aid law. In fact, if based solely on number crunching, the application of the MEOP may frustrate the aim of State aid control that is safeguarding a ‘level playing field’ for all market participants.

Małgorzata Agnieszka Cyndecka

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 4, Page 512 - 526

One of the consequences of the financial crisis is a development and refinement of the Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP). The MEIP is a well-established yardstick for determining whether a given State intervention confers an economic advantage upon a recipient undertaking, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. Although most State interventions in favour of financial institutions have aimed to remedy the systemic crisis, and thus amounted to aid, the MEIP has remained a vital instrument in applying Articles 107(1) TFEU and 61(1) EEA. As the relevant case law and decisional practice of the Commission and EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) demonstrate, the use of the MEIP under exceptional market conditions has raised some interesting issues. Those concern both its applicability and application. In particular, while ESA apparently excluded the applicability of the MEIP due to absence of ‘normal market conditions’, the Commission denied applying it to an amendment to repayment terms of aid. As regards the application of the MEIP, the ‘business-hostile’ conditions must be duly taken into account when assessing whether the State entered a given transaction on market terms. Keywords: MEIP; Application; Applicability; Financial Crisis.