European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 21 (2022), Ausgabe 3,

Gianni De Stefano, Wouter Dutillieux

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 21 (2022), Ausgabe 3, Seite 222 - 236

SMEs are the backbone of Member States’ economies, and are central to the EU’s economic development and resilience as a whole. Risk finance aid addresses market failures or other relevant obstacles that prevent SMEs and certain other non-large enterprises (ie, start-ups or certain middle-capitalisation firms (mid-caps), namely small or innovative mid-caps) from attracting the financing they require (eg, loans, guarantees or equity) to develop to their full potential. Risk finance aid for SMEs and start-ups, up to €15 million per beneficiary, can be block-exempted under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER); whereas aid to innovative or small mid-caps, or aid that goes beyond the GBER conditions, can be notified by the Member State and approved by the European Commission under the Risk Finance Guidelines. This article describes the revised Risk Finance Guidelines of 2021 and the ongoing revision of the GBER section on risk finance. Keywords: risk finance; risk capital; SMEs; start-ups; mid-caps; access to finance; GBER; Risk Finance Guidelines

Maria Segura

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 21 (2022), Ausgabe 3, Seite 219 - 221

Marianne Clayton, Maria Segura

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 21 (2022), Ausgabe 3, Seite 340 - 342

Emma Besselink

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 21 (2022), Ausgabe 4, Seite 454 - 457

Caroline Buts, Malgorzata Agnieszka Cyndecka, José Luis Buendía

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 20 (2021), Ausgabe 3, Seite 397 - 426

Katrine Lillerud

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 20 (2021), Ausgabe 3, Seite 337 - 358

This article provides an overview of the position of quasi-legislative measures also referred to as ‘soft law’ before and after the State aid Modernisation (SAM). The main intention of the article is to illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the revised horizontal and sectorial guidelines with the general block exemption regulation (GBER) after SAM. It demonstrates how a selected handful of horizontal and sectorial guidelines have been transformed to facilitate better use of the block exemption to enhance the Commission’s own policy objectives, in a nice hand in glove fit with the GBER to nudge States into block exempted expenditure. The empirical study compares Norway, Sweden and Finland’s use of the GBER and guidelines. It shows that the framework is now more than ever nudging aid expenditure. The micro study reveals a drastic change in use before and after SAM in the three Nordic countries – underling the nudging power of the reform. Keywords: EStAL PhD Award; soft law; guidelines; GBER; horizontal; SAM; nudging; Nordics.

Anna Nowak-Salles

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 20 (2021), Ausgabe 3, Seite 359 - 369

This article, based on a thesis defended at the European University Institute in October 2020, pursues a twofold aim: first, to apply the error framework, which is an economic analysis tool used in competition law, to State aid, and to discover what determines the expected cost of error in this area. Second, to reflect on whether this expected cost might be reduced and to provide ideas where improvements might be sought. For this purpose, it verifies whether errors in State aid assessment at the Commission and the national level are rare, cheap and effectively corrected. On the basis of this analysis, which constitutes an original assessment of the reform of Procedural Regulation and of the GBER, it draws useful conclusions and formulates some recommendations as to how to increase accuracy at a reasonable cost. Keywords: State aid procedure; error in assessment; notification procedure; GBER.

Caroline Buts, Péter Staviczky

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 20 (2021), Ausgabe 4, Seite 546 - 559

Eesti Pagar constitutes a milestone in State aid law. This article provides an overview of the judgment and discusses, in chronological order, the topics of the five questions dealt with by the Court. First, we review the importance of the criterium incentive effect and more specifically the timing of the aid application in relation to the start of the project. Second, we analyse the obligation of a national authority to recover unlawful aid, also in the absence of a Commission decision. Third, we investigate whether actions by national authorities (in breach of EU law) can cause legitimate expectations for an aid beneficiary. Fourth, regarding recovery procedures without a Commission decision, we reflect on the pertinent limitation period. Finally, we examine the applicable recovery interest rate. Keywords: incentive effect; complaints; recovery; (recovery) interest rate/reference rate; limitation period, GBER, illegal aid, obligation of national granting entities Milestones Preview: this article is based on a chapter of the upcoming second edition of the book 'Milestones in State Aid Case Law' (Lexxion 2022).

Catherine Banet

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 19 (2020), Ausgabe 2, Seite 172 - 184

Looking at the practical case of the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy (EEAG) (2014-2020) and implementation of them, this article intends to re-open the debate on the legal status of soft law instruments in EU State aid policy. It analyses the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the manner the latter distinguishes between the legal force and the legal effects of the State aid guidelines, not only on the Commission, but also on third parties like Member States. The article puts in perspective the careful approach of the Court in not recognising the possible indirect effects of the guidelines on Member States or individuals with the procedural and structural changes in the adoption of the guidelines. With the implementation of the State Aid Modernisation, a circular process in three steps has been established between the adoption of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), the new State aid guidelines and the proposals for new secondary legislation. In this process, the guidelines assume the function of a bridge, building on the binding principles enshrined in the GBER and preparing the revision of sectoral EU directives and regulations. With the upcoming revision of the GBER and the EEAG which is now scheduled for adoption in 2021, the same dynamic will most probably apply. The revision of the GBER and the EEAG will need to reflect the content of the newly adopted Clean Energy Package for All Europeans, but will also play a crucial role in preparing the grounds for amending relevant secondary legislation in line with the Commission’s European Green Deal Strategy. Keywords: EEAG 2014-2020, renewable energy, support schemes, GBER, legal force, legal effects