Małgorzata Cyndecka

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 18 (2019), Issue 2, Page 180 - 185

When the State grants an economic advantage to an undertaking, it may avoid triggering Article 107(1) TFEU by complying with the Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP). Yet, if the State invokes the MEOP in the course of the administrative procedure, it must establish unequivocally and on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence that it acted as a rational, profit-oriented, prudent and well-informed private market operator would have acted in similar circumstances under normal market conditions. If the State provides such information, the Commission is required to carry out an overall assessment, taking into account all relevant evidence in the case enabling it to determine whether the beneficiary would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from a private operator. While granting an economic advantage to an undertaking in financial difficulties does not necessarily amount to aid, the State must prove that it properly took into account the additional risk involved in a given measure when it decided to implement it. Ignoring such signs of a firm being in difficulty as increasing losses, diminishing turnover or mounting debt is not in line with the behaviour of a prudent private shareholder and it questions the economic rationality of the State’s conduct. This may entitle the Commission to qualify a given measure as aid. Keywords: MEOP; burden of proof; prudent shareholder; firm in difficulties; State guarantees.

Anne Louise Bengt Jespersen

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 18 (2019), Issue 4, Page 458 - 469

The Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP) is an essential tool in State aid law when determining whether a specific State measure confers an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Despite the many clarifications in the jurisprudence over the years, the applicability of the MEOP to specific economic transactions and the assessment of the economic rationality of a State measure continue to be subject to debate before the Commission and the EU Courts. Since the ruling of the Court of Justice in EDF, a recurring question in this debate has been the apportioning of the burden of proof in cases where the MEOP is invoked by the Member State and/or the alleged aid beneficiary. In more recent cases, the EU Courts have further developed the principles concerning the apportioning of the burden of proof as well as the standard of proof required on the part of the Commission and the Member States, respectively. This article analyses the approach of the Commission and the EU Courts with respect to the burden of proof in MEOP Cases prior to and after EDF, in SACE, Larko and Frucona Košice. Furthermore, the article reflects on the latest developments in the EU Courts’ Case law and points to a potential ambiguity therein. Keywords: MEOP; Burden of proof; Requirement of evidence ex ante; Allocation of burden of proof.

Małgorzata Agnieszka Cyndecka

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 4, Page 546 - 552

In the awaited FIH judgment, the CJEU once again reviewed the question of costs or risks that may be taken into account under the application of the MEOP. It is now clear that the origins of such costs or risks are crucial. What may make sense in terms of economics, which is one of the two components of the MEOP, is not necessarily in line with State aid law. In fact, if based solely on number crunching, the application of the MEOP may frustrate the aim of State aid control that is safeguarding a ‘level playing field’ for all market participants.

Małgorzata Agnieszka Cyndecka

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 2, Page 192 - 203

One of the questions raised by the unprecedented state interventions in favour of banks that were hit by the financial crisis is whether the mere fact of having benefitted from aid in the past qualifies any future state measures granted to the same undertaking as aid. Given the number and importance of beneficiaries that received ‘crisis aid’ under article 107(3)(b) TFEU, this question merits a prompt answer. In terms of State aid law, it amounts to establishing the applicability of the Market Economy Operator Principle, MEOP. While the General Court (GC) ruled on consecutive state measures under Article 107(1) TFEU in the BP Chemicals case of 1998, recent case law has raised much controversy. This article attempts to clarify the implications of disregarding or misapplying BP Chemicals and the consequences of such practice to the MEOP while the CJEU is about to give its ruling in FIH, a highly debatable case on consecutive state measures in the banking sector. Keywords: Applicability and Application of the MEOP; Banking Sector; Consecutive State Interventions; BP Chemicals Formula; FIH Case.