Pamela Hansson, Malin Persson

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 1, Page 140 - 141

Marko Milenkovic

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 1, Page 66 - 79

Serbia’s EU integration process has only commenced after the political change in 2000. The cornerstone of the relations between the country and the EU is the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which mandates the full alignment of State aid measures with the EU standards. Since 2006, subsequent governments have been working on aligning the substantive rules for the granting of State aid with the (ever-changing) EU framework, with a growing number of State aid measures and schemes being notified to and approved by the Commission for State Aid Control (CSAC). However, this period was also characterised by a severe economic crisis. By examining the legal framework, institutional structure for State aid control and overall experiences of the first phase of the implementation of the Law on State aid, this paper draws conclusions on the major challenges and obstacles encountered introducing the new regulatory regime in the context of a deep economic crisis, on-going enlargement fatigue and conflicting political legacies. Keywords: Serbia; Institutional Transformation; EU Conditionality; Enlargement Fatigue.

Édouard Louis Jean-Baptiste Bruc

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 1, Page 54 - 65

The willingness to encourage private parties to seek compensation has emphasised the necessity to push forward economic analysis regarding antitrust cases. The question concerning a passing-on defence thus entered the sphere of public enforcement of EU State aid law via a judgment which highlighted the possibility to take a passing-on defence regarding the ‘undercharge’ passed on to the consumer through the entrustment (lowering prices). However, the ECJ quashed the judgment, preferring a more deterrent approach, implicitly stressing that it can only be a‘Pyrrhic victory’ because it would require predictions as regards the behaviour of the benefiting undertaking and its results. In the author’s view, this rollover is an opportunity to underline the difference between public and private enforcement aims, and to understand the role of private enforcement under State aid law which in fact requires a passing-on analysis. Keywords: Passing-on, Private Enforcement; Unlawful State aid; Recovery.

George Peretz QC

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 1, Page 80 - 84

Juan Jorge Piernas López

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 2, Page 274 - 281

Keywords: Regional tax on large retail establishments; Freedom of establishment; Protection of the environment and town and country planning; State aid; Selective measure; Letter from the Commission stating that no further action will be taken on a complaint; Existing aid.

Maria Rosaria Miserendino

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 2, Page 204 - 211

The object of this work is the analysis of the issues which arose after the coming into force of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRM); in particular, the (new) role of the European Commission (EC) on State aid for the Banking Sector. This work analyses the complex procedure of resolution created after the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation and the cooperation between the Commission and the SRB on State Aid in that procedure, with a focus on precautionary recapitalisation.Keywords: State aid; Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation; BRRD; Resolution procedure; Precautionary recapitalisation.

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 2, Page 259 - 263

Michele Giannino, Federich Romby

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 3, Page 338 - 352

The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive review of the European Commission’s approach in assessing whether compensation awarded to airports for the provision of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEIs) complies with the EU State aid rules. The article analyses the defensive strategies open for national authorities to claim that airports public service compensation packages are compatible with the internal market. In that regard, the article considers the Altmark doctrine and the compatibility conditions for the application of the SGEI exception in Article 106 TFEU. Then it critically compares the strong and weak points of each of these strategies and also dwells on which factors national authorities have to adduce to prove the compatibility of airport aid. Bearing in mind the difficulties for national authorities to satisfy all the conditions for the application of the Altmark doctrine, the article suggests that the SGEI exception should be the optimal strategy to obtain regulatory clearance of public service compensation to airport.

Sarah Beeston, Pim Jansen, Kiek Brink

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 3, Page 328 - 337

The European Commission sees the ports sector as a driving force for economic growth and regional development in Europe. It has recently developed various policy initiatives in this sector and taken measures whereby State aid control forms the key element. The Commission has opted for an approach based on two interlinked pillars. First, the Commission intends to create a (more) level playing field among European Union Member States, by using State aid rules to curb tax benefits for (public) companies in the ports sector. Second, further to the State Aid Modernisation Programme, the Commission is, to an increasing extent, pursuing an active European economic policy in the ports sector by means of exemptions from the prohibition of State aid. As a result, certain aid measures targeting market failures and objectives of a common European interest are permissible. In this article we will provide an analysis of recent developments and place them in their legal and policy-related context. We will specifically discuss the impact of these developments on seaports in the Netherlands.

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 3, Page 368 - 374

The amount of State aid in a loan or guarantee is not necessarily equal to the principal of the loan or the guaranteed amount. Moreover, the liability of the State and the risk borne by the State depend on the rights or collateral that the State secures before it grants a loan or guarantee. For this reason, State aid law needs a third concept to describe the behaviour of the State apart from that of ‘public authority’ or ‘private investor’. That third concept is labelled here as ‘ex-ante creditor’. It applies to those sums over which the State can exercise a claim without expecting ex-ante to receive a profit. Past loans or guarantees that contain State aid should be ignored, as prescribed by the Court of Justice, only when the State has no prospect of recovering any amount that is due to it or when it has no claim to exercise against the borrower who is the aid recipient. Keywords: Private investor; Private creditor; Loans; Guarantees; Past State aid.