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The MEOP in the Larko Case · Case T-423/14 Larko Geniki · Annotation by Małgorzata Cyndecka journal article

Annotation on the Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 1 February 2018 in Case T-423/14 Larko Geniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki AE v European Commission.

Małgorzata Cyndecka

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 18 (2019), Issue 2, Page 180 - 185

When the State grants an economic advantage to an undertaking, it may avoid triggering Article 107(1) TFEU by complying with the Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP). Yet, if the State invokes the MEOP in the course of the administrative procedure, it must establish unequivocally and on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence that it acted as a rational, profit-oriented, prudent and well-informed private market operator would have acted in similar circumstances under normal market conditions. If the State provides such information, the Commission is required to carry out an overall assessment, taking into account all relevant evidence in the case enabling it to determine whether the beneficiary would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from a private operator. While granting an economic advantage to an undertaking in financial difficulties does not necessarily amount to aid, the State must prove that it properly took into account the additional risk involved in a given measure when it decided to implement it. Ignoring such signs of a firm being in difficulty as increasing losses, diminishing turnover or mounting debt is not in line with the behaviour of a prudent private shareholder and it questions the economic rationality of the State’s conduct. This may entitle the Commission to qualify a given measure as aid. Keywords: MEOP; burden of proof; prudent shareholder; firm in difficulties; State guarantees.


DHL Leipzig-Halle  ∙ Case T-452/08 ∙ Annotation by Daniel Harrison journal article

Developments since the Judgment of the General Court in DHL Leipzig-Halle

Daniel Harrison

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 16 (2017), Issue 3, Page 487 - 494

As the case of DHL-Leipzig Halle demonstrated, the possibility that contractual measures implementing an unlawful aid measure are invalid and unenforceable can give rise to a curious paradox: where the State assumes a contingent liability that has not yet crystallised, unenforceability of the contractual "advantage" may mean that unlawful aid is, like Schrödinger's cat, both present and absent at the same time. This article looks at the two cases since DHL Leipzig-Halle that have cited the judgment, before considering other areas in which contractual unenforceability of State aid measures can impose adverse – and often unfair – consequences on parties that have received no advantage or benefit from the aid measure in question: State guarantees and warranties and indemnities given to buyers of privatised businesses. Keywords: Unlawful Aid; State Guarantee; Borrower's Liabilities; Warranties and Indemnities; Privatisation; DHL Leipzig-Halle; Aer Lingus.

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