Christopher McMahon

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 23 (2024), Issue 1, Page 4 - 14

The State aid rules apply to a wide range of interventions on the internal market that take a variety of different forms. This poses challenges for the case law on the identification of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU as it seeks to adapt the standards it applies to different circumstances while avoiding formalism. Criticisms in the academic literature of the application of the prohibition on aid to fiscal measures are frequently premised on the assumption that the rules should apply in a different way to such measures on account of their relationship with the sovereignty of Member States in the field of taxation. The manner in which the law on the application of the State aid rules to fiscal measures remains unsettled. This article examines a substantial doctrinal obstacle to any form of differentiation in the standards used to identify fiscal and non-fiscal measures in the form of two related maxims which recur throughout the case law. The first holds that aid is defined in relation to its effects. The second is that regulatory technique is irrelevant to the classification of a measure as aid. This article will chart the development of these established formulae in the case law and explain their relationship to one another, arguing that they represent a significant, but not absolute impediment to the articulation of distinct standards to identify aid in the form of fiscal measures. Keywords: Effects; Objectives; Selectivity; Fiscal Measures; Taxation; Article 107(1) TFEU; Formalism

Wout De Cock, Gregory Kegels, Caroline Buts, Cind Du Bois

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 2, Page 150 - 160

The current geopolitical situation has led to various calls for investment in Europe’s strategic autonomy, for example with regard to the defence and security sector. However, the possibility for Member States to grant financial support is restricted by EU State aid law, leading some stakeholders to argue that there is a friction between the geopolitical need to invest in Europe’s strategic autonomy on the one hand, and EU State aid law on the other. In this contribution, we examine whether Member States could avoid and/or alleviate this friction by invoking Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. This Treaty provision, often overlooked by legal scholars, stipulates that Member States may, in principle, take all measures they consider necessary for the protection of their essential security interests, without having to consider EU State aid law. By analysing relevant case-law of the EU Courts, however, we argue that the aforementioned Treaty provision has a limited scope, and that, therefore, Member States, in principle, must comply with the EU State aid rules when they contribute to Europe’s strategic autonomy. Keywords: Article 346(1)(b) TFEU; (open) strategic autonomy; investments; essential security interests; dual-use goods; R&D; defence sector

Tamás Kende, Gábor Puskás

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 2, Page 205 - 211

Article 107(3)(c) TFEU requires a delicate balancing of the positive effects of the aid aiming the development of certain economic activities and the negative effects thereof. The Paks II judgment provides clarifications as to the limits of this balancing process and the European Commission’s obligations to take into account primary and secondary EU laws other than those related to State aid, as well as fundamental goals of the EU Treaties like the protection of environment. The Paks II judgment also confirms that State aid rules are also applicable concerning activities falling under the EURATOM Treaty and clarifies the relationship between State aid and public procurement and an infringement procedure and a State aid procedure. The Paks II judgment also shows that Member States have a hard time with challenging the Commission’s State aid decisions if they rely on an alleged err in law or they attack the Commission’s discretionary powers and the proper application thereof.

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 4, Page 371 - 380

State aid that compensates for damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences can run into many millions. It has the potential to cause a serious distortion to competition in the internal EU market. Yet, Article 107(2)(b) declares that aid compatible with the internal market without any prior assessment of its positive and negative effects by the Commission. This immediately raises the question - why is that aid considered by the TFEU to be compatible with the internal market? A corollary question is whether compensatory aid can be granted only to some of the undertakings harmed by a natural disaster or exceptional occurrence. The Court of Justice has recently answered the latter question by ruling that compensatory aid for a limited number of beneficiaries is not excluded by Article 107(2)(b). This paper argues that the latter question cannot be answered without deriving a plausible answer to the former question. Given the structure and overall objective of Article 107, a plausible answer is that compensatory aid tends to restore rather than distort competition. Therefore, compensatory aid that is granted to a limited number of beneficiaries is likely to be discriminatory beyond the extent that is inherent in any State aid measure and to cause excessive distortion of competition. Keywords: Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, compensation for damage, selectivity, discrimination.

Julie Leroy

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 4, Page 384 - 396

A Member State which violates the standstill-obligation under Article 108(3) TFEU is not directly held responsible for his failure to comply with his obligations under EU law, as it is the aid beneficiary who will be obliged to repay the unlawful (and incompatible) State aid. This contribution evaluates if the aid beneficiary can nevertheless hold the Member State somehow responsible, through a damage claim based on the latter’s extra-contractual liability for the violation of EU law. The Belgian case study shows that such a claim can be successful, as the conditions of Articles 1382-1383 Old Civil Code might be fulfilled. However, the aid beneficiary is in a difficult position. One the one hand, this undertaking bears the ‘risk of proof’. On the other hand, a full compensation will be rare as, amongst others, the aid beneficiary’s own fault might lead to a liability apportionment. Finally, the obligation to repay the unlawful State aid (with interest) as such will never qualify as a damage that is eligible for a compensation, as this would undermine the effectiveness of EU law. Keywords: Article 108(3) TFEU; standstill-obligation; recovery of unlawful (and incompatible) State aid; liability of Member States; Belgium

Łukasz Stępkowski

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 4, Page 397 - 411

This article addresses the principle of res judicata in the context of rules on State aid, including the case-law of the Court of Justice and the 2021 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts. The limits of the principle at issue required by Article 108(3) TFEU and the powers of national courts to recover unlawful aid (with or without a recovery decision from the Commission) are discussed. The law is stated as it stood on 1 January 2022 (with some later developments). The case-law on res judicata referred to here includes the decisions of the Court in Lucchini, Klausner Holz, and CSTP/Buonotourist, with commentary on the practical effect of the Court’s approach. Keywords: Lucchini; Klausner Holz; res judicata; Article 108(3) TFEU; national courts

Ilkka Aalto-Setälä, Henrik J. Koivuniemi

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 4, Page 449 - 452

The Finnish State aid saga in the bus transport sector has become to a provisional end, as the General Court found in Cases T-597/19 and T-603/19 that certain measures taken by the City of Helsinki constituted unlawful State aid. The judgement showcases various interesting aspects of State aid law, particularly procedural rights of interested parties in the context of economic continuity. This annotation introduces the procedural matters at issue in Case T-603/19 and walks through the Court’s reasoning.

Juan Jorge Piernas López

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 4, Page 458 - 460

Sylvain Petit

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 1, Page 139 - 143

On 21 October 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down a preliminary ruling on the notion of ‘State resources’ regarding the French increased responsibility scheme for producers of waste from textile products, household linen and footwear products (TLC products). The CJEU ruled that a system set up by the State whereby producers of TLC products pay financial contributions to an eco-body which then enters into an agreement with sorting operators and provide them financial support for the recycling and treatment operations of the waste, may not constitute an intervention through State resources. This ruling emphasizes that the notion of ‘public control’ lies in the details: a range of circumstantial evidences is required to determine the extent of the public oversight over the funds channelled between private operators.

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 1, Page 4 - 14

The article argues that the judgment of the Court of Justice in case C-594/18 P Austria v Commission, which appeared to limit the criteria that the Commission uses to determine the compatibility of State aid, may have a positive impact on State aid control if it makes the assessment of the Commission more transparent. There is a need for greater transparency in the ‘weighing’ of the positive and negative effects of State aid and the ‘balancing’ of those effects. The weighing and balancing of the effects of State aid are not easy tasks. But it will be necessary for the Commission to be more explicit about the model it relies on to conclude that aid is compatible or not. Keywords: Article 107(3)(c) TFEU; compatibility with internal market; common interest; affectation of trade; distortion of competition; Hinkley Point C