Anna Nowak-Salles

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 1, Page 86 - 88

Cees Dekker

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 2, Page 193 - 198

It is settled case law that the Commission may adopt guidelines and notices setting out how it will exercise its discretion under the State aid rules. These guidelines and notices limit the way in which the Commission exercises its powers. In the present case, the Court of Justice also assumes that role in relation to the Commission's Guarantee Notice. However, unlike other cases in which the Union Courts have ruled on the role of the Guidelines, which concerned the Commission's application of Article 107(3) TFEU, the present case concerns the application of Article 107(1) TFEU. It is also settled case law that the Commission does not have a wide margin of discretion in the application of Article 107(1) TFEU, as the concept of aid is legal in nature. The question is, therefore, whether the Commission can impose restrictions on itself in its assessment under Article 107(1) TFEU. The Court of Justice ignores this question.

Marianne Clayton, Maria Segura, Gaétan Roelants du Vivier

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 2, Page 207 - 209

Gianni De Stefano, Wouter Dutillieux

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 3, Page 222 - 236

SMEs are the backbone of Member States’ economies, and are central to the EU’s economic development and resilience as a whole. Risk finance aid addresses market failures or other relevant obstacles that prevent SMEs and certain other non-large enterprises (ie, start-ups or certain middle-capitalisation firms (mid-caps), namely small or innovative mid-caps) from attracting the financing they require (eg, loans, guarantees or equity) to develop to their full potential. Risk finance aid for SMEs and start-ups, up to €15 million per beneficiary, can be block-exempted under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER); whereas aid to innovative or small mid-caps, or aid that goes beyond the GBER conditions, can be notified by the Member State and approved by the European Commission under the Risk Finance Guidelines. This article describes the revised Risk Finance Guidelines of 2021 and the ongoing revision of the GBER section on risk finance. Keywords: risk finance; risk capital; SMEs; start-ups; mid-caps; access to finance; GBER; Risk Finance Guidelines

Benjamin Linke

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 3, Page 328 - 331

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 1,

Andreas Bartosch

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 1, Page 1 - 2

Juan Jorge Piernas López

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 2, Page 313 - 314

Katrine Lillerud

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 3, Page 337 - 358

This article provides an overview of the position of quasi-legislative measures also referred to as ‘soft law’ before and after the State aid Modernisation (SAM). The main intention of the article is to illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the revised horizontal and sectorial guidelines with the general block exemption regulation (GBER) after SAM. It demonstrates how a selected handful of horizontal and sectorial guidelines have been transformed to facilitate better use of the block exemption to enhance the Commission’s own policy objectives, in a nice hand in glove fit with the GBER to nudge States into block exempted expenditure. The empirical study compares Norway, Sweden and Finland’s use of the GBER and guidelines. It shows that the framework is now more than ever nudging aid expenditure. The micro study reveals a drastic change in use before and after SAM in the three Nordic countries – underling the nudging power of the reform. Keywords: EStAL PhD Award; soft law; guidelines; GBER; horizontal; SAM; nudging; Nordics.

Steven Verschuur, Cecilia Sbrolli

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 19 (2020), Issue 3, Page 284 - 289

The European Green Deal is the prelude and the foundation of a daunting, but necessary, environmental-centric industrial revolution. EU legislation has obviously dealt with environmental policies in the past, but the European Green Deal is a far-reaching project that will require unprecedented investments. The transition envisioned in the European Green Deal will also require amendments to a wide variety of existing EU legislation and policies, including in the field of State aid. The Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy (EEAG), in force until the end of 2021, are the legal framework in force to assess environmental State aid. This raises the question whether these Guidelines are a suitable instrument to achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal. This paper is the first of a series that will discuss the interplay between existing State aid rules and policy on the one hand and the European Green Deal on the other. It will provide a broader introduction to the European Green Deal and its envisaged means of financing and will discuss the application of the incentive effect to the State aid assessment of national support measures to achieve objectives of the European Green Deal. Keywords: EU Green Deal, Environmental and Energy Guidelines, incentive effect, environmental targets, financing