Totis Kotsonis

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 1, Page 15 - 29

The article provides an overview of the subsidy control commitments under the TCA and considers their implications for UK subsidy control regulation. Issues considered in this context include the extent to which TCA subsidy control differs from EU State aid rules and what additional flexibilities this might offer. Consideration is also given to the remedies available to interested parties with concerns about the grant of a subsidy, the inter-Party dispute resolution mechanisms, the availability of unilateral trade defence measures, as well as the question of the different levels of harm to trade or investment for which different TCA provisions provide. The article also highlights certain areas which require further attention, including the fact that the current UK subsidy control regime is not concerned with the potentially competition distortive effects of a subsidy on the UK internal market. Separately, the article considers the question of whether the absence of a prior notification requirement has an impact on the effectiveness of the UK subsidy control system. Keywords: subsidy control; UK; TCA; level playing field; trade; Brexit

Carole Maczkovics

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 19 (2020), Issue 3, Page 271 - 283

The COVID-19 pandemic requires massive State intervention in the economy. To allow EU Member States to act decisively, the Commission committed to make flexible use of State aid rules. This article examines how, over the first four months of the crisis, these rules have been applied to measures notified by EU Member States in view of addressing the consequences of the crisis on their economy. It further highlights the risks that the more flexible application of State aid rules in the context of the current crisis can present for the level playing field and the internal market, and argues that the EU Recovery Plan would not be able to remove those risks. Finally, it recommends that the Commission reviews whether aid measures comply with the general principle of equal treatment and, where it is given discretion under the Treaty, considers imposing conditions counter-balancing distortions of competition, and as the case may be, enabling the green and digital transition so as to ensure, to the largest extent possible, fair competition and the integrity of the internal market. Keywords: COVID-19, level playing field, internal market, equal treatment, conditionality

Sarah Beeston, Pim Jansen, Kiek Brink

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 17 (2018), Issue 3, Page 328 - 337

The European Commission sees the ports sector as a driving force for economic growth and regional development in Europe. It has recently developed various policy initiatives in this sector and taken measures whereby State aid control forms the key element. The Commission has opted for an approach based on two interlinked pillars. First, the Commission intends to create a (more) level playing field among European Union Member States, by using State aid rules to curb tax benefits for (public) companies in the ports sector. Second, further to the State Aid Modernisation Programme, the Commission is, to an increasing extent, pursuing an active European economic policy in the ports sector by means of exemptions from the prohibition of State aid. As a result, certain aid measures targeting market failures and objectives of a common European interest are permissible. In this article we will provide an analysis of recent developments and place them in their legal and policy-related context. We will specifically discuss the impact of these developments on seaports in the Netherlands.