Anduena Gjevori

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 2, Page 161 - 174

Since the adoption of the first State aid law by North Macedonia, the Western Balkan (WB) countries have shown – to a certain degree – the willpower to approximate the laws adopted in the field of State aid with the EU State aid acquis. However, the first State aid commissions closely linked to the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Economy had an essential weakness in their institutional structure. This article aims to establish a connection between the chosen types of State aid regulators in the WB and their operability during the transposition and enforcement of the Temporary Framework for Covid-19 outbreak. In this framework, the article examines the transposition of the Temporary Framework of March 2020 into the national legislations of the WB countries. Moreover, it analyses selected decisions granting Covid-19 State aid, comparing them with the Temporary Framework. Only two out of six countries of the WB, under analysis, (partially) transposed the Temporary Framework. The Covid-19 State aid has been mostly retroactively approved and has, in some cases, been implemented without being assessed by the relevant State aid authorities. Even in the few cases that have been notified, Covid-19 State aid has been granted in contradiction with the Temporary Framework. Additionally, the few decisions imposing conditions for Covid-19 State aid have not been implemented by the appropriate public authorities. Keywords: EU candidate countries; State aid monitoring authorities; Temporary Framework; Covid-19

Sofie Holtan Lakså

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 22 (2023), Issue 4, Page 356 - 370

This article is adapted from the author’s College of Europe Master’s Thesis which was awarded the Lexxion Publisher prize for the Best Thesis on EU State aid. One of the measures put in place to mitigate the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the European economy was the Covid-19 Temporary Framework. Adopted on 19 March 2020, it granted Member States flexibility under the State aid regime to support their national economies from their own pockets. While the relaxed rules were deemed necessary, the Framework was introduced with a known caveat: it is well-established that the granting of State aid distorts competition on the internal market. It is for the same reason that certain criteria have to be met for the Commission to approve the granting of aid, amongst them the principle of proportionality. This article argues that a large share of the aid approved under the Temporary Framework was in fact not proportionate to the shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, and should therefore not have been approved by the European Commission. The results demonstrate that the aids granted under the Temporary Framework cannot be considered proportionate in nature: of the 19 sectors analysed, the aid was found not to be disproportionate to the shock caused by the pandemic in only one sector. Keywords: Temporary Framework; proportionality; subsidy race; COVID-19

P. Kamil Rosiak, Ewa Przybyszewska

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 21 (2022), Issue 3, Page 334 - 335

Petar Petrov

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 4, Page 461 - 478

The outbreak of COVID-19 has devastating effects on national economies and on various business sectors. To prevent even harder consequences, Member States have adopted various support packages in order to support the hardest-hit businesses, including air carriers and airports. In order to support Member States’ initiatives, the European Commission has adopted temporary applicable State aid rules deemed more appropriate to these extraordinary circumstances. Without surprise, the rather fast authorisation of a number of State aid support schemes has open the door to litigation, giving the EU courts the occasion to rule on a number of matters. Given the importance of air carriers for both Member States’ economies and connectivity, the current paper focuses on the impact of COVID-19 on air carriers and on the recent State aid developments in this field. Keywords: support schemes; COVID-19; Temporary Framework; airlines; aviation; non-discrimination; balance of interests

Christopher McMahon

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 2, Page 249 - 257

During the pandemic, many Member States have engaged in more interventionist policies to sustain their economies through tough public health restrictions. This has manifested itself in the provision of large quantities of State aid to elements of the aviation industry by Member States, facilitated by the relatively permissive policies of the European Commission. The Irish low-cost airline Ryanair has been a notable and outspoken critic of these measures, describing them as ‘state aid crack cocaine’ and their beneficiaries as ‘state aid junkies’ and has launched an aggressive programme of litigation to annul the decisions approving the aid. This article reviews the first nine of the judgments of the General Court that this litigation has produced to date, three of which have led to the annulment of the Commission’s approval of the aid. This article will go on to assess the impact of these decisions and examine the contribution they make towards understanding the State aid response of the EU and its Member States to the pandemic. It will be suggested that the General Court has generally taken a tolerant attitude towards pandemic-related aid for aviation, upholding the approval of individual aid and allowing Member States to confine the aid to recipients with a close connection to their own economies. Keywords: COVID-19; Temporary Framework; aviation; non-discrimination.

Marijana Liszt, Petra Kontić

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 20 (2021), Issue 1, Page 160 - 164

Phedon Nicolaides

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 19 (2020), Issue 1, Page 29 - 38

This paper examines possible options for Member States to redress the impact of the corona virus (SARS-CoV2) on financial institutions in the context of the directive on bank recovery and resolution, the regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism and the State aid rules on banks. The EU banking regime requires, in principle, that the granting of State aid to a bank should lead to its resolution or liquidation. The paper considers how Member States may support banks outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU and how State aid may be granted without triggering resolution or liquidation. The current measures which are rolled out by European governments to support the real economy will indirectly benefit banks too. The paper reviews the recently announced ‘Temporary Framework’ according to which any ‘indirect aid’ to banks will not infringe the provisions of the directive or regulation. The paper identifies gaps in the current rules concerning solvent, but not systemic banks, ambiguities in the interpretation of the concept of ‘serious disturbance’ and unclear guidance as to how indirect aid may be minimised. Keywords: Bank resolution; Liquidation; Temporary Framework; COVID-19.

Paula Riedel, Thomas Wilson, Shane Cranley

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 19 (2020), Issue 2, Page 115 - 126

Against the background of the COVID-19 outbreak and the effects of public health measures on Member State economies, the Commission has acted impressively quickly to prevent State aid rules becoming a block to necessary interventions. The Commission has published a Temporary Framework under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, which has been amended twice including to allow for recapitalisation of firms in return for State participation. Aid under this Temporary Framework along with a wide range of measures approved under Article 107 TFEU has allowed billions in aid to be granted, ensuring that liquidity is available to companies. This liquidity has avoided mass bankruptcies but comes with the risk of distortions of competition across the internal market; a risk augmented by the differences in approach of the Member States. As Member States exit the initial phase of the response to the crisis focused on liquidity, and move to more structural measures such as recapitalisations, we can expect the design of aid to be monitored even more closely to minimise market distortions. The Commission’s initial response has been flexible, swift and pragmatic and is to be lauded but many potential pitfalls remain as the crisis moves to the next phase.  Keywords: COVID-19, Temporary Framework, recapitalisation, distortion of competition

Georgiana Pop, Ana Amador

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 19 (2020), Issue 2, Page 127 - 136

All countries across the globe are speeding up economic measures to tackle the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Many of these measures, which have adopted different forms, fundamentally aim at providing liquidity to companies and reducing the pressure on cash-flows of most affected sectors. Even if subsidies and State aid can provide immediate support to ailing companies in extraordinary circumstances, governments should not forget the disruptive effects that subsidies can bring on competition and international trade in the longer run. Keywords: COVID-19, coronavirus, subsidies, design, general measures, EU Temporary Framework

Maria-Konstantina Lili-Kokkori

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 19 (2020), Issue 4, Page 525 - 528