Anduena Gjevori

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 22 (2023), Ausgabe 2, Seite 161 - 174

Since the adoption of the first State aid law by North Macedonia, the Western Balkan (WB) countries have shown – to a certain degree – the willpower to approximate the laws adopted in the field of State aid with the EU State aid acquis. However, the first State aid commissions closely linked to the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Economy had an essential weakness in their institutional structure. This article aims to establish a connection between the chosen types of State aid regulators in the WB and their operability during the transposition and enforcement of the Temporary Framework for Covid-19 outbreak. In this framework, the article examines the transposition of the Temporary Framework of March 2020 into the national legislations of the WB countries. Moreover, it analyses selected decisions granting Covid-19 State aid, comparing them with the Temporary Framework. Only two out of six countries of the WB, under analysis, (partially) transposed the Temporary Framework. The Covid-19 State aid has been mostly retroactively approved and has, in some cases, been implemented without being assessed by the relevant State aid authorities. Even in the few cases that have been notified, Covid-19 State aid has been granted in contradiction with the Temporary Framework. Additionally, the few decisions imposing conditions for Covid-19 State aid have not been implemented by the appropriate public authorities. Keywords: EU candidate countries; State aid monitoring authorities; Temporary Framework; Covid-19

Marianne Clayton, Maria Segura

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 21 (2022), Ausgabe 3, Seite 340 - 342

María Muñoz de Juan

European State Aid Law Quarterly, Jahrgang 17 (2018), Ausgabe 4, Seite 483 - 493

Ex post monitoring is a counterpart of the State aid decentralisation process and, as such, is a cornerstone of the current State aid control system. The application of State aid rules is being increasingly decentralised thanks to the significant use of the block exemption Regulations by the Member States. However, this does not mean that the Commission is giving up its powers and obligations under the Treaty. On the contrary, it closely follows — through ex post controls — how State aid measures are implemented by the Member States. This Commission-level monitoring exercise aims to correct the detected irregularities both for the past and for the future and helps to improve State aid rules. It has a measurable deterrent effect. Keywords: State aid; enforcement; monitoring; ex post control; SAM; decentralisation; block exemption regulation.